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Abstract 
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) regulate the ecolabeling of products from fisheries 
with the aim of promoting sustainable fishery practices.  To date 11 fisheries have attained full 
certification and a further 7 are under review.  Together these fisheries offer 220 ecolabeled 
marine products to consumers.  Despite great potential to encourage sustainable fisheries, 
and thereby bring conservation benefits to marine systems, there are a range of issues that 
may serve to limit the wider uptake of MSC ecolabeled products.  These include a general 
lack of consumer concern for marine fish and sustainable fisheries, an absence of guaranteed 
continued financial benefits to participating fishers and difficulties of quality assurance which 
are related to the complexities in monitoring compliance of marine fisheries.   In addition, it is 
apparent that property-rights over the fishery seem to be an essential prerequisite for 
engagement in MSC and this is one major impediment to wider uptake of the scheme in 
current marine fisheries, which tend to be open access.  Some modifications to the current 
scheme may be needed if wider participation of marine fishers is to be achieved.  These may 
include a tiered approach to certification, certification of fishers rather than fisheries, 
governmental facilitation to assist the latter, and greater engagement with retailers and buyers 
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rather than individual consumers.  None of these changes will occur without constructive 
engagement of Government, retailers and the fishing industry. 
 
Introduction 
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is the champion of the globally recognised standard 
by which marine eco-labeled products are assessed, and products bearing the MSC label 
have won the patronage of royalty and celebrity chefs alike. Retail giants are beginning to put 
MSC-labeled products on their shelves, with 220 different products currently on offer (R. 
Howes, personal communication). The basic philosophy underpinning the MSC is similar to 
that of ecolabeling schemes that operate across other product types, and assumes that the 
existence of a given ‘label’ or ‘mark’ on a product indicates that certain principles and/or 
practices have been adhered to during its production.  In this way consumers who are 
concerned about certain production related practices are able to preferentially select products 
that best meet their personal philosophies.  Normally ecolabeled products are sold at a 
greater price to similar non-ecolabeled products.  This price premium may serve either to 
recompense producers for any extra effort required to generate products to the standards 
demanded of ecolabels, and/or act as an additional incentive to maintain engagement in the 
required production practices.  Ecolabeling schemes may benefit conservation as they offer a 
means whereby large numbers of people can reward producers who undertake their business 
in an ‘environmentally-friendly’ manner.  Given the dependence of all market economies on 
consumer choice, this is potentially a very powerful way for consumers to influence the 
behaviour of many large industries. 
 
Many of the world’s fisheries are over-exploited and have wider negative effects on non-target 
species (e.g. marine mammals, seabirds, reptiles), ecosystem processes and habitats (e.g. 
cold water corals, seagrass meadows) (Kaiser et al. 2002; Pauly et al. 2002; Myers & Worm 
2003). Ecolabeling of fishery products has the potential to exert influence on the fishing 
industry to bring about changes in fishing practices.  However, since the inception of the MSC 
in 1997, to date only eleven marine fisheries have received full MSC certification, with a 
further seven being under review (www.msc.org).  Against this background the purpose of this 
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essay is to review the potential for ecolabeling to encourage sustainable marine fisheries, to 
review why MSC certification has been relatively limited to date and to consider options for 
promoting and enabling industry engagement with ecolabeling.  
 
Potential for ecolabeling to promote sustainable fisheries 
 
Consumer issues 
 
Ecolabeling is not a new concept, and variants on the ecolabel approach are currently wide-
spread in the supply of timber (Holvoet & Muys 2004) and agriculturally based products, e.g. 
organically grown farm produce (Byng & Redman  1992; Greene & Kremen 2003).  However, 
the experience gained from using ecolabels in these markets suggests that the concept has 
some pitfalls from which those concerned with developing fishery related ecolabels may gain 
some valuable insights.  First, consumers actually have to care about the sustainable 
practices associated with an ecolabel before they will choose to buy it.  For example 
proponents of the ‘ecolabeling’ approach to fishery management frequently refer to the 
example of ‘dolphin-safe’ tuna to illustrate the potential of consumers, retailers and 
processors to change fishing practices.  In the dolphin/tuna example, fishing practices 
changed almost overnight in response to public outrage at the reported high by-catch rate of 
dolphins, and resulted in legislation in the United States to enforce and define ‘dolphin safe’ 
tuna fishing (although the creditability of this product has been controversial (Hall 1996)) . 
However, there are two major caveats that need to be flagged when using this example.  
First, it was entirely fortuitous that the fishery for tuna was able to reduce drastically its catch 
of dolphins simply by altering the manner in which fish were caught (by using the so called 
‘back-down’ technique) and by making some minor technical adjustments to the fishing 
equipment.   Second, the aim of the certification was to protect a mammal, not a fish, and we 
know the public express higher preferences for mammals over many other taxa (Kuitenen & 
Tormala 1994; Czech et al. 1998).  So the public appeal of dolphins may have played an 
important role in the success of the scheme.   A second relevant issue apparent in terrestrial 
ecolabeling systems is that consumers do not necessarily rely on the best scientific 
information when making purchasing decisions.  In other words the perceived benefits of the 
ecolabel may not equate with its actual measured benefits.  For example, consumers tend to 
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buy organic food according to perceived ethical and health benefits (Wilkins & Hillers 1994; 
Robinson et al. 2002) regardless of whether these perceptions are supported by scientific 
evidence (Williams 2002).    
 
Thus two fundamental challenges to ecolabeling of marine fisheries are that the general 
public may not value the good being offered by the scheme (i.e. they do not care that much 
about marine fish or other non-target components of the associated ecosystem) and the 
science of a ‘sustainable fishery’ is hard to communicate to consumers.   So when deciding 
whether or not to buy ecolabeled fish products, consumers are not able to stand in a shop 
and make a simple choice between one fish product that ‘kills dolphins’ and one which does 
not.  Rather they will need to have some perception of the benefits offered by a ‘sustainable 
fishery’.  This will require consumers to take a long term perspective on activities that impact 
species that are not inherently appealing, generally occur a long way from their homes and 
are undertaken by people they do not know.  The issue is further confused by the fact that for 
many years general public health and nutritional advice has encouraged people to eat more 
fish (e.g. www.seafish.org), and it may take some time before the public will be able to 
reconcile this message with the goals of biodiversity conservation. 
. 
 
Producer issues 
Even if consumers demand an ecolabeled product, a sustainable supply chain cannot be 
established unless tangible benefits accrue to producers.  Consequently, successful 
ecolabeling schemes depend on some portion of the price premium flowing to producers.  
This requires some level of organisation amongst fishers and strong links with retailers.   Not 
only do retailers need to be willing to promote ecolabeling schemes and give them ‘shelf 
space’ in order to generate consumer demand, they also need to offer some long term 
guarantee that initial price premiums will be maintained.  In this respect fishers considering 
whether or not to join an ecolabeling scheme may be deterred by the history of nearly all 
agricultural certification schemes.  For example, up until a few years ago organic produce 
returned a healthy profit margin over equivalent non-organic food and sold as a niche market 
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product. However, in recent years there has been a commoditization of organic foods that has 
seen large multiple retailers erode this margin (DeLind 2000).  In addition, and across nearly 
all certification schemes, the same large retailers have moved from offering certified food 
products as ‘high quality niche products’ in a sea of uncertified produce, to a situation where 
farmers need to be members of a certification scheme simply in order to sell their food to the 
retailer.  In this situation producer financial margins have been eroded, but the costs of 
certification remain in place.  So while society may gain some benefits from more widespread 
sustainable farm practice, farmers are now probably financially worse off than before the 
certification scheme was introduced (GEJ personal observations).  
 
Monitoring issues 
Other complicating issues of ecolabeling marine fish relate to monitoring the activities of 
scheme members.  The essence of implementing certification in forestry and farming relates 
to compliance to agreed standards on given pieces of land (i.e. a farm or forest).  Subsequent 
monitoring seeks to maintain this standard, and is relatively straightforward as inspectors can 
usually directly observe the impact of current and past management activities.  Monitoring 
and management of sustainable practices in marine systems is logistically much more 
complex because of issues like the non-selective nature of many fishery harvest techniques, 
the absence of easily observable impacts of non-compliance, and the complications of 
multiple access rights to shared fish resources that are often highly migratory.  However, 
regardless of how complex monitoring may be, the credibility of any ecolabeling scheme rests 
on its adherence to agreed standards.  Unless ecolabel schemes actively review potential 
new entrants, monitor existing members and strictly enforce standards, then consumers and 
retailers may lose faith in the ecolabeling scheme.  This is a real challenge for marine 
ecolabeling initiatives but forms the basis of some of the criteria set as standards by the MSC.  
  
 
Impediments to ecolabeling of marine products 
Most fisheries are not like the tuna fishery example given above, and despite Governments in 
the US and Europe investing millions in long-term research to alleviate the environmentally 
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damaging effects of fishing gear, we are a long way short of providing environmentally friendly 
fishing equipment for most fisheries.  Further, despite increasing the availability of accessible 
documents describing the drastic impacts of fishing on the environment, fish and benthic 
invertebrates remain largely unloved by the public (at least while they are alive!).   Against this 
background it is interesting to ask whether these or other issues, can explain why so few 
fisheries are attempting to undertake the MSC certification process?  To begin answering this 
question it is necessary to summarise the  MSC principles and criteria for sustainable fishing.  
These are: 
 
1. A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing or 
depletion of the exploited populations and, for those populations that are depleted, 
the fishery must be conducted in a manner that demonstrably leads to their recovery. 
2. Fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, productivity, 
function and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and associated dependent 
and ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends. 
3. The fishery is subject to an effective management system that respects local, national 
and international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and operational 
frameworks that require use of the resource to be responsible and sustainable. 
(www.msc.org) 
 
Those fisheries that currently meet the MSC criteria are characterised by the following 
attributes: they are highly selective for their target species (e.g. South West Mackerel fishery, 
New Zealand Hoki), the stocks occur within known areas for which there are exclusive 
national access rights, they have limited access (with the exception of the South Georgia 
Patagonian toothfish fishery) and they are well regulated and enforced and often involve co-
management between Government, scientists and fishers (Table 1).  It is also interesting to 
note that these fisheries are either relatively small (annual landings 100 to 12 000 t) or 
relatively large (annual landings 160 000 – 1 100 000 t), and there are presently no 
certificated intermediate-sized fisheries.  So it seems that qualification for the MSC label is 
relatively straight-forward (we use the word cautiously) for fisheries under the control of a 
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limited group of fishers, as this creates a set of quasi exclusive user-rights. As a result, the 
choice to be precautionary and fish responsibly is unimpeded by external factors such as 
international conventions or agreements that grant access to foreign fleets that may disregard 
fishery regulations.   
 
However, the majority of the World’s fisheries bear little resemblance to the MSC certified 
fisheries.  Most fishermen have little control over the setting of fishing quotas and share the 
fish resource with multiple unassociated individuals or with fishers from other nations who 
may not choose to fish responsibly (Kaplan & McCay 2004). Fishers that participate in these 
systems are effectively excluded from even considering MSC certification due to the actions 
of others that are beyond their control.    Despite this, it is frustrating that many small-scale 
fisheries in Europe and North America have a large number of ‘eco-friendly’ attributes but fall 
short of one or two of the essential ‘sustainability’ criteria as specified by the MSC. For 
example, the brown crab Cancer pagurus fishery (the Inshore Potting Agreement) off the 
south coast of Devon UK has many of the characteristics of the trap fisheries for Crustacea 
that currently hold MSC certification: it is a limited access fishery that falls within national 
territorial waters, it has low bycatch and fishers enforce their own ban on landing egg bearing 
females. However brown crabs are highly migratory and much of the stock is prosecuted or 
impacted (through bycatch and incidental mortality) by fishers that operate outside the south 
Devon area. Hence fishers that operate within the IPA have little opportunity to influence the 
actions of others with whom they share the brown crab resource (Blyth et al. 2002; 2004). In 
the United Kingdom, many of the fishers that participate in these systems convey an attitude 
that is highly sceptical of a process that might bind them financially to the whim of retail 
giants, and are reluctant to invest in what they perceive as an expensive and complex 
accreditation process that offers no guarantee of a favourable outcome (MJK personal 
observations).  For example, in the case of Sweden, fishers did not trust either of the original 
partners that instigated the MSC, the corporate (Unilever) nor the environmental NGO (WWF) 
and chose the national organic certifier instead. 
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Against this background it is questionable whether the current MSC, or similar schemes, can 
realistically hope to offer significant benefit to global fisheries given: 1) consumer apathy, 2) a 
current inability to recognise and reward ‘good practices’ of individual fishers whose 
endeavours are thwarted by the unsustainable actions of others beyond their influence, 3) the 
uncertainty of a successful outcome after substantial time and financial investment in the 
certification process and 4) concern regarding the future certainty of a premium price 
associated with a certified product.  
 
Options for future developments of ecolabeled fishery products 
So, without giving up entirely on an eco-labeling approach, what are the options for improving 
the conservation benefit that may derive from certification?  Firstly it is noticeable that all of 
the currently certified MSC fisheries are associations of individuals or companies that behave 
collectively, and have an input into the management process (co-management) (Table 1).  So 
the formation of a greater number of fishing cooperatives would provide a mechanism for 
better collective decision making and strategy with respect to harvesting practices and 
behaviour (e.g. Gelcich et al., 2005).  The latter may require Governmental intervention to 
facilitate and subsidise this process if it is to be as effective as in Chile where Government 
policy has effectively forced fishers to work collectively to submit applications for management 
responsibility for defined areas of the sea (Gelcich et al. 2005; Castilla et al. in press). Thus 
Government intervention would appear to be a fundamental first step towards developing the 
underpinning structures that would enable currently disparate fishers to modify their behaviour 
appropriately to achieve the requirements for MSC certification.  Such approaches are likely 
to be most successful when applied  to inshore fisheries and in countries that exercise large 
national exclusive economic zones and thereby avoid the complexities of multiple-access, 
such as found with the Common Fisheries Policy in Europe (Philippson 1999, Symes and 
Philippson 1998, 1999). 
 
For this reason  it may be time to consider a softer approach to the certification standard set 
by the MSC or other certification schemes.  A tiered ranking, e.g. gold, silver and bronze, 
could be used to signify the level of achievement reached on the road to full sustainability.  
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Such an approach would set clear goals for improvement in fishing practices and 
management approaches while acknowledging the positive features of qualifying fisheries.  
Such a mechanism would also offer opportunity for regular assessment and even demotion or 
expulsion from a scheme following non-compliance.   Criticisms of this approach are that too 
many different sorts of label, combined with more on-label information, could confuse the 
consumer, and also that fishers operating at lower levels of the certification schemes are still 
using the MSC logo and this may dilute the impact of the highest standard of achievement. 
Nevertheless, it is important that the ultimate goal (i.e. MSC certification), is made to appear 
to be more attainable to more fishers, and a stepwise progression (that offers some reward) 
through the system could foster engagement within the wider fishing community.  
 
An alternative approach may be to switch the focus of attention away from consumers, and on 
to retailers and other users of marine products.   This avoids the fundamental flaw in all 
certification schemes, that if consumers fail to value the goods being certified, then sufficient 
sales will not occur, and the certification will not benefit the environment.  To some extent this 
approach was adopted by certifiers of timber products who persuaded retailers and users of 
timber (e.g. governmental and other large institutions) of the validity of their argument, and 
thereby simultaneously increased the supply of certified product in stores and improved 
demand from large institutions who gained some public relations advantage from the process 
(e.g. see Buckley & Ansell 2000). 
 
A final option may be to certify individual fishers that fish sustainably even if the stock is 
overfished.  If such an approach is to work it is imperative that the product can be traced  to 
individual fishers, an approach that is already a key component of the MSC scheme.  This 
approach would need to be tied into supply chains that meet the criteria of sustainability.  If an 
individual fisher then transgressed the agreed rules, they would be excluded from supplying 
this chain.  Similarly if any of the processors transgressed, e.g. by buying from non-certified 
fishermen, they too would be excluded from the chain.  Clearly such an idea would need to be 
clearly thought through, but it is interesting to note that, in concept, it is not too far way from 
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recent developments in some agricultural food supply chains (Ferrarese 2004, Hobbs et al. 
2005). 
 
In conclusion,  certification of  fisheries has a potentially valuable role to play in changing the 
manner in which we extract biological resources from the sea, by effecting changes in the 
behaviour of participants across the supply chain. However, at present there are a small 
number of fisheries that have the potential to engage in such schemes, and hence their 
conservation benefit is limited.  In practice both issues of governance and the social context 
of fish and fisheries are obstacles to a wide-scale adoption of an effective ecolabeling scheme 
(Symes 2000).  This  situation that is only likely to improve with innovative support from both 
Governments and those operating in the food chain. 
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Table 1: Key features of fisheries awarded Marine Stewardship Certification as of April 2005. Data extracted from the MSC website (www.msc.org) where further details on each fishery are 
available. Annual landings are given as approximate values (in the case of Alaska salmon this has been estimated from landings of 200 million fish per annum) as these are likely to vary from year 
to year according to the level of Total Allowable Catches (TACs).  
Fishery 
 
Gear Annual 
landings (t) 
Fishery shared 
with other 
nations? 
Management body Management mechanism Market 
Large-scale fisheries       
Bering Sea/Aleutian 
Islands pollock fishery  
Midwater 
trawls 
c. 1 100 000 No North Pacific Fishery Management 
Council (US) 
TAC and quota allocation to meet management plans, 
permit limited entry, fishing seasons, observer 
monitoring, area and fishing gear restrictions 
Asia, USA, Europe (frozen product)  
and Japan (surimi) 
The Alaska salmon 
fishery  
Drift and set 
gillnets 
Purse seine 
Trolling 
c. 320 380 
 
No Alaska Department of Fish and Game Occurs within delineated districts, multiple technical 
regulations (bag limits, minimum landing sizes) and 
management of other participants (sport fishing) and 
components of the ecosystem (e.g. habitat) 
 
Whole frozen or processed canned, 
Japan, EU, USA 
South African Hake 
Trawl Fishery 
Bottom 
trawling 
c. 195 000 No Department of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism: Branch Marine and 
Coastal Management 
Technical measures (mesh size), TACs allocated to 
companies, limits on number of vessels and closed 
areas 
South Africa, frozen product to Spain, 
France, Portugal, Italy, Australia and 
US, fresh chilled product to Germany, 
Spain and France. 
New Zealand 
Hoki         
Midwater 
and bottom 
trawling 
c. 100 000 No New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries and 
Hoki Fishery Management Company 
(fishers) 
TAC set below maximum sustainable yield, satellite 
monitoring of large vessels (> 42 m), industry run 
observer programme, severe penalties for breach of 
regulations 
Primarily export to US, Japan, 
European Union and Australia 
Small scale fisheries       
Western Australian 
Rock Lobster  
Static 
bottom set 
trap fishing 
c. 10 500 No Government of Western Australia, 
Department of Fisheries, processors 
and fishers 
Technical measures (seasonal area closures, 
minimum landing sizes, prohibition on catching 
breeding females), TACs and licensing 
Exported to Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, 
China, US and Europe 
South Georgia 
Patagonian Toothfish 
Longline fishery  
Bottom set 
longlines 
c. 4 400 Yes, but managed by 
single organisation 
Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 
Implementation by the Government of 
South Georgia and South Sandwish 
Islands (UK territory) 
Seasonal restriction (open from May to August). TAC 
set by CCAMLR, management funded through license 
fees, providing for enforcement and monitoring 
US, European Union and Japan 
Burry Inlet cockles  Hand raking c. 3 500 No South Wales Sea Fisheries Committee Defined area, minimum landing size, participation 
controlled by license 
Primarily northern European markets as 
processed product, UK, Spain, Holland, 
France and Portugal 
South West Mackerel 
(Scomber scombrus) 
handline fishery  
Handlining c. 1 750 No Department of Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs and the Cornish Sea 
Fisheries Committee 
Minimum landing size, TAC, fishery closure upon 
reaching TAC. 
UK wholesale, Europe (France and 
Italy) 
Red Rock Lobster 
Mexico 
Static 
bottom set 
trap fishing 
c. 1 300  No Sub-delegation of fisheries (fishers), 
National Fisheries Institute and 
governmental research bodies 
Defined area, limited entry, user rights given to fishing 
co-operatives, TACs, minimum landing sizes and 
protection for gravid female  
Primarily export to Asia, US and France 
Loch Torridon 
Nephrops norvegicus 
Static 
bottom set 
trap fishing 
c. 150  No European Union and Scottish Executive 
for Environment and Rural Affairs 
Defined area closed to other forms of fishing Primarily exported to Spain as live 
product 
Thames Blackwater 
Herring 
Drift gill net  c. 121 No Department of Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs and the Essex Sea 
Fisheries Committee 
TAC, technical measures (mesh size), trawling 
prohibition over herring spawning grounds. N.B. 
concurrent trawl fishery not certified. 
UK processors 
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